SecretStore local vault extension

What is the SecretStore local vault extension

The SecretStore local vault extension is a PowerShell module extension vault for Microsoft.PowerShell.SecretManagement. It is a secure storage solution that stores secret data on the local machine. It is based on .NET cryptography APIs, and works on Windows, Linux, macOS thanks to PowerShell Core.

The secret data is stored at rest in encrypted form on the file system and decrypted when returned to a user request. The store file data integrity is verified using a cryptographic hash embedded in the file.

The store can be configured to require a password or operate password-less. Requiring a password adds to defense-in-depth since password-less operation relies solely on file system protections. Password-less operation still encrypts data, but the encryption key is stored on file and is accessible. Another configuration option is the password timeout, which by default is 15 minutes for automation purposes you can use Unlock-SecretStore to enter the password for the current PowerShell session for the duration of the timeout period.

Testing the SecretStore local vault extension

Below you will find a demonstration script where I register a vault of the type secret store. This is a local vault extension that creates its data and configuration files in the currently logged-in user scope. You specify the vault type to register by the ModuleName parameter.

$MySecureVault1 = 'LocalSecVault1'
#Register Vault1 in secret store
Register-SecretVault -ModuleName Microsoft.PowerShell.SecretStore -Name 
$MySecureVault1 -DefaultVault

#Verify the vault is there

#Add secrets to Vault 1
Set-Secret -Name "DATAWISETECH\serverautomation1in$MySecureVault1" -Secret "pwdserverautom1" -Vault $MySecureVault1
Set-Secret -Name "DATAWISETECH\serverautomation2in$MySecureVault1" -Secret "pwdserverautom2" -Vault $MySecureVault1
Set-Secret -Name "DATAWISETECH\serverautomation3in$MySecureVault1" -Secret "pwdserverautom3" -Vault $MySecureVault1

#Verify secrets

Via Get-SecetInfo I can see the three secrets I added to the vault LocalSecVault1

SecretStore local vault extension
SecretStore local vault extensionThe three secrets I added to vault LocalSecVault1

The configuration and data are stored in separate files. The file location depends on the operating system. For Windows this is %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\PowerShell\secretmanagement\localstore. For Linux and MacOS it is $HOME/.secretmanagement/localstore/

SecretStore local vault extension
The localstore files

As you can see this happens under the user context. Support for all users or machine-wide context or scope is a planned future capability, but this is not available yet.
Access to the SecretStore files is via NTFS file permissions (Windows) or access control lists (Linux) limiting access to the specific user/owner.

Multiple Secret stores

It is possible in SecretManagement to register an extension vault multiple times. The reason for this is that an extension vault may support different contexts via the registration VaultParameters.

At first, it might seem that this means we can create multiple SecretStores but that is not the case. The SecretStore vault currently operates under the scope of the currently logged-on user at a very specific path. As a result, it confused me when I initially tried to create multiple SecretStores. I could see all the secrets of the other stores. Initially, that is what I thought happend. Consequenlty, I had a little security scare.. In reality, I just register different vault names to the same SecretStore as there is only one.

$MySecurevault2 = 'LocalSecVault2'
$MySecureVault3 = 'LocalSecVault3'

#Register two more vaults to secret store
Register-SecretVault -ModuleName Microsoft.PowerShell.SecretStore -Name $MySecurevault2 -DefaultVault
Register-SecretVault -ModuleName Microsoft.PowerShell.SecretStore -Name $MySecureVault3 -DefaultVault

#Note that all vaults contain the secrets of Vault1
#Add secrets to Vault 2
Set-Secret -Name "DATAWISETECH\serverautomation1in$MySecureVault2" -Secret "pwdserverautom1" -Vault $MySecureVault2
Set-Secret -Name "DATAWISETECH\serverautomation2in$MySecureVault2" -Secret "pwdserverautom2" -Vault $MySecureVault2
Set-Secret -Name "DATAWISETECH\serverautomation3in$MySecureVault2" -Secret "pwdserverautom3" -Vault $MySecureVault2

#Note that all vaults contain the secrets of Vault1 AND Vault 2
SecretStore local vault extension
Note that every registered local store vault beasically sees the same SecretStore as they all point to the same files.

Now, if you think, that multiple SecretStores per user scope are a good idea there is an open request to support this: Request: Multiple instances of SecretStore · Issue #58 · PowerShell/SecretStore (

KeePass SecretManagement extension vault

KeePass SecretManagement extension vault

The SecretManagement and SecretStore can work with SecretManagement extension vault modules. These can be found in the PowerShell Gallery using the “SecretManagement” search tag. Some example are:

I use KeePass and as such, the KeePass SecretManagement extension vault is the one I will demonstrate. First of all, install the module. Note that I chose to use the most recent beta version, which is 0.9.2-beta0008 at the time of writing this blog post.

Install-Module -Name SecretManagement.KeePass -AllowPrerelease

Naturally, if you haven’t installed SecretManagement and SecretStore modules yet, you must now really do that to be able to play with them.

Install-Module Microsoft.PowerShell.SecretManagement, Microsoft.PowerShell.SecretStore

Now that has been taken care of we can start testing the KeePass SecretManagement extension vault.

Using the KeePass SecretManagement extension vault

I created a demo KeePass .kdbx file in which I stored some example user names with their passwords. This file has a master password. You can also use a key or the Windows user account if you want to do so.

Our demo .kdbx file

Now I will register the KeePass file as a Vault

Register-KeePassSecretVault -Name 'WorkingHardInITKeePassVault' -Path 'C:\SysAdmin\Authentication\workinghardinit.kdbx' -UseMasterPassword
KeePass SecretManagement extension vaultRegister the KeePass Vault

As you can see this prompts you for the KeePass Master Pasword.

Keepass Master Password
Enter the Keepass Master password for: C:\SysAdmin\Authentication\workinghardinit.kdbx
Password for user Keepass Master Password:

Now that is done, I will unlock the KeePass secret vault so I can use it in automation without being prompted for it. By default, it remains unlocked for 900 seconds (15 minutes). This is configurable.

Unlock-KeePassSecretVault -Name 'WorkingHardInITKeePassVault'
Unlock the KeePass Vault, by entering the store password and, if not opened yes the KeePass master password
$FCcreds = Get-Secret -Name 'FC Switch 01'  -Vault 'WorkingHardInITKeePassVault'
$FCSwitchUser = $FCcreds.GetNetworkCredential().UserName
$FCSwitchPwd  =$FCcreds.GetNetworkCredential().Password
write-Host -foregroundcolor Green "FC Swicth 01 username $FCSwitchUser has $FCSwitchPwd for its password"
KeePass SecretManagement extension vault
We grab the username for the FC Switch 01 entry in the KeePass secret Vault.

Note that the entry for the secret is a network credential. As result, we can use the properties of the credential object to obtain the username and password in plain text. That is to say, we can (and should) use the credentials directly. You do not need to show or use the password in plain text. I did this here to show you that we got the correct values back.

Credentials ready to use.

Updating and adding secrets

Currently, updating the secrets with is not supported.

Let’s hope that theu allow updating and document using the hash table to enter metadata better in the future.

We need to first remove the existing one for now and re-enter the information. We’ll see how this evolves

Remove-Secret -Name 'FC Switch 01' -Vault 'WorkingHardInITKeePassVault'
$FCcreds = Get-Credential -UserName 'fcadmin'
Set-Secret -Name 'FC Switch 01' -Secret $FCcreds -Vault 'WorkingHardInITKeePassVault'

Finally, the good news is that there is also a PowerShell KeePass module that you can use for that sort of work. So you have the means in PowerShell to do so. See Getting Started · PSKeePass/PoShKeePass Wiki (


That was fun, was it not? The SecretManagement and SecretStore modules are going places. I hope this helps and happy scripting!

Protecting your Veeam Backup and Replication Server is critical


In this blog, we will demonstrate one of the things that can go wrong when someone gets a hold of your Veeam Backup & Replication server administrative credentials. They can do more than “just” delete all your backups, replicas, etc. When they can logon to the Veeam Backup & Replication Server itself they can also grab all the credentials form the Veeam configuration database. Those credentials normally have privileges that you do not want to fall into the wrong hands. These are quite literally the keys to the kingdom. Hence, protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical.

Protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical

Security is not about one feature, technology or action. It takes a more holistic approach. It requires physical security to start with. You also need to adhere to the principles of least privilege rigorously. All this while locking down access, reducing the attack surface, leveraging segmentation, etc.

A key element lies in prevention. You must avoid the harvesting of those credentials. For this reason, you absolutely must practice privileged credential hygiene. Today you also want to leverage multi-factor authentication in order to protect access even better. All this, and more, prevents unauthorized access in the first place. Even when one measure fails. Read Veeam Backup & Replication 9.5 Update 3 — Infrastructure Hardening for more details on this.

Protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical
Add MFA to portect your credentials being abused when compromised

Veeam Backup & Replication itself requires credentials to do its work of protecting data and workloads. Access to servers, proxies, repositories, interaction with virtual machines, etc. cannot happen without such credentials. Veeam encrypts the passwords of these users via strong encryption. They use the Microsoft CryptoAPI (FIPS certified) with the machine-specific encryption key for this.

As a side note, you might have seen the big fuss around the critical vulnerability in January 2020 regarding CryptoAPI. This is a reminder of why you need to keep your systems patched.

Protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical

It ensures decryption of those passwords on another host than the one were encrypting them happened, fails. This means that even if someone steals the configuration database, or in some shape, way or form gets a hold of the encrypted password in the database they cannot be decrypted. This is an industry-standard and quite safe. What you need to know is that when someone gains access to your machine with local administrative rights, all bets are off.

What can happen?

The moment an attacker logs on to the Veeam Backup & Replication server with administrative rights, it is game over.

They will be able to grant themselves access to SQL Server and query it for the credentials. With that information, all they need to do is load and use a Veeam DLL to decrypt them. When this runs on the server where you encrypted them, this will succeed. If anyone would get hold of the encrypted password and tries to decrypt them on another host this will fail as that host has the wrong machine-specific key.

Let me emphasize once more that this is not a insecure implementation by Veeam. When you store encrypted passwords for a service, that service must be able to decrypt them. Otherwise, they can never use them. You cannot get the passwords via the GUI or the Veeam PowerShell commands. But via code, this is quite possible.

Sample code to proof that protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical

I assembled a little PowerShell script that grabs the data from the Veeam configuration database. For this purpose, I filter out the passwords that have an empty string. We loop through the ones that remain and decrypt the passwords. In the end, I decided not to post the script as it might help people with bad intentions. I know it won’t stop bad actors cold in their tracks and maybe I will update this post later. But for now, did not include it.

Sorry, right now you can only see the output below from a example VBR Server

In the screenshot below you can see the results. This is a demo lab with demo credentials, so no worries about showing this to you. Remember that you can only decrypt the password on the Veeam Backup & Replication server where you encrypted them.

Protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical

There they are, the users with the encrypted and decrypted passwords

To prove a point we will grab the encrypted passwords and try to decrypt them on another VBR server so we have around to do so. This fails with an Exception calling “GetLocalString” with “1” argument(s): “Key not valid for use in specified state. error.

Protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical
No matter what encrypted password you try to decrypt on another host it will fail as you don’t have the correct machine specific key.

As you can see even if you get a hold of the encrypted strings they cannot be decrypted on another machine. You must do this on the machine that encrypted them.


While to some this might be a shock when they first learn of this., it is not a gaping security hole. It just shows you that security is more than encryption. It takes multiple measures on multiple levels to protect assets. I repeat, protecting your Veeam Backup & Replication Server is critical. For many people, this is indeed an eye-opener. The lesson is that you must protect your assets adequately. Do not bank on one feature to hold off any and all threats by itself. That is asking for the impossible.

I do hope that all Veeam software itself will also support MFA in the future. That would also help protect access via the Veeam Backup & Replication console.

The Darwin award with MFA push notifications


Recently in a talk with a pen tester I was demoing an end-user security risk that is relatively new on the scene. Apps that automatically confirm MFA push notifications. This effectively bypasses conscious user interaction and approval of any login attempt secured with a push notification. Hence the Darwin award with MFA push notifications phrase was born.

The Darwin award with MFA push notifications

Just when some security people worried more about the people with push notification suffering from security fatigue as being the biggest risk we go step further. Never mind people accepting any notification like Pavlov’s dog in a semi-unconscious, conditioned action. They have even grown tired of this an turn to MFA bypass apps to handle this for them.

The Darwin award with MFA push notifications
Yes, the Darwin award is only one approval away!

More then ever it seems that disabling any kind of self-service for device registration with MFA is key. On top of that, it is a sobering reminder that a strong password and conscious user actions are still very much key to providing security via MFA. I am not bashing DUO here. This was just the one I tested and it worked shockingly well.


I think for some people and organizations one or more FIDO2 keys will be the better option. Unless mobile device management can prevent people from installing auto-responder apps for push notifications you might have an issue. Or, they need to find a way to block such tools. Whatever I can come up with breaks the ease of use of push notifications but there are smarter and more knowledgeable people out there than me, so who know what they come up with. Microsoft Authenticator seems to have some capabilities to prevent this. I don’t know if you can enforce it 100% and if this cannot be bypassed in code as well.

Approve sign-in box on computer
You get a number challenge …
Approve sign-in box on device
… and you need to tap the correct number.

This, however, does nothing against conditioned responses of pushing a button or scanning a fingerprint on a FIDO2 key. So, remain vigilant. The sobering fact is that the adoption of MFA is disappointingly low. And no matter how many scary MFA bypass stories your read MFA is a key aspect of securing access today. It puts you far ahead of the curve. If done well and with well thought out procedures it is a formidable barrier for but the most determined attackers. Actually MFA bypass attacks are very rare still. Most of us are not that interesting targets but it can help keep out the majority of casual or professional thieves looking for quick wins on easy targets.